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I. Introduction
Although behavioral science has an established role in jurispru-
dence, the two disciplines have not always kept pace. A relatively
recent behavioral science advance has been recognition of the sex-
ual identity anomaly of transsexualism. At the time I co-edited the
first interdisciplinary textbook on this variation in 1969,' writers
necessarily defined the term "transsexualism" whenever used, in-
cluding in professional works. Now, school children know the
meaning. The courts, however, have not fully appreciated the ad-
vances in science's understanding of the complexities of either sex-
ual identity or transsexualism. This Comment describes that gap
and the legal consequence.
Transsexualism is the enduring, pervasive, compelling desire to
be a person of the opposite sex. 2 Several hundred Americans un-
dergo sex reassignment from male to female or female to male each
year. This compulsion to change anatomic sex is not modifiable by
psychiatric intervention. Psychiatry can benefit the transsexual,
however, by facilitating a careful monitoring of a pre-operative trial
period of cross-gender living. During this period the transsexual
explores, in reversible fashion, what life will be like after irreversible
surgery - the "real life test." Employment in the desired gender
role is a necessary component of that test. Such employment is criti-
cal both because it demonstrates the person's ability to function so-
cially in that role and prepares the person economically for the
medical procedures. Post-operatively, many transsexuals continue
to seek employment in their new gender role as they follow their
new life course.
Major hurdles have been placed in the pre- and post-operative
paths of transsexuals seeking employment, however. They are often
refused or terminated from jobs upon disclosure or discovery of
1. TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEx REASSIGMENT (R. GREEN &J. MONEY eds. 1969), [here-
inafter cited as GREEN & MONEY].
2. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, III 263 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM III].
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their status. To seek legal relief, they have resorted to § 703 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) which prohibits an employer
from refusing to hire or from discharging any individual because of
the individual's sex. 3 Title VII, however, has yet to spell relief. An
alternative source of relief sought by some transsexuals is the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, which forbids discrimination against handi-
capped persons who are otherwise qualified for employment. 4 This
Act, however, may pose more hardship than relief.
II. The Criteria of "Sex"
While Title VII prohibits employer discrimination based on a per-
son's sex, the determination of a person's sex is not simple. An in-
dividual's sex can be determined by multiple criteria including the
sex chromosomes (either the XX [female] or the XY [male] config-
uration), the gonads (ovaries or testes), hormonal levels (predomi-
nantly androgens [male hormones] or estrogens [female
hormones]), genital appearance (penis or clitoris, scrotum or labia),
and internal reproductive structures (uterus and vagina or prostate
and seminal vesicals). These criteria may be inconsistent within a
given individual such as with hermaphroditic or "intersexed" per-
sons. 5 However, the criterion of sex that is most salient to the her-
maphroditic individual is not any of the above somatic criteria. The
essential criterion is gender or sexual identity, namely whether the
person considers himself or herself to be a male or a female. For
the hermaphroditic person this overriding psychologic criterion must
conflict with at least one of the somatic criteria.
Definitional problems of sex are compounded by the fact that
gender or sexual identity is also a complex phenomenon; it is a com-
posite of three different components: 1) the person's basic self-con-
ception as male or female; 2) gender-role behavior (cultural features
of masculinity and femininity); and 3) sexual orientation or sexual
partner preference (sexual interactions with persons of the same or
other sex). 6 These three components permit delineation of three
variants of gender or sexual identity among physically normal (non-
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1982).
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
5. For example, with the congenital virilizing adrenogenital syndrome, the person
may have the XX female chromosome configuration plus ovaries and a uterus, but a
male level of androgenic hormones as well as a penis and a scrotum. SeeJ. MONEY & A.
EHRHARDT, MAN AND WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL 42-48 (1972).





hermaphroditic) persons. They are 1) transvestism, 2) homosexual-
ity, and 3) transsexualism. The three variants are easily distin-
guished both behaviorally and psychologically.
Transvestites are anatomic males who have an episodic, compelling
desire to wear women's clothes. Sexual arousal accompanies the
fantasy or act of cross-dressing. Transvestites are not discontent be-
ing male. They are sexually attracted to persons of the other sex.
7
Thus, transvestites are atypical only on component 2 of sexual identity,
i.e. gender-role behavior. Homosexuals are persons of either gender
whose erotic attractions are primarily or exclusively to persons of
the same anatomic sex. They usually dress in clothes associated
with their own sex. They are content being the gender in which they
were born. Thus, homosexuals are atypical only on component 3 of
sexual identity. Transsexuals are discontent being of the sex to which
they were born. They want to live as persons of the other sex. They
want to dress as persons of the other sex. Their erotic attractions
are usually to persons of the same anatomic sex.8 Thus, transsexu-
als are atypical on all three components of sexual identity. These dis-
tinctions are critical in an examination of the employment cases in
which transsexuals have sought relief.
III. The Ulane Case
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines9 provides the most detailed account of a
transsexual filing suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. For a decade, Karen Ulane had been a male pilot with Eastern
with an excellent employment record. An increasing desire to be-
come a woman led Ulane to wear women's undergarments and to
undergo female hormone treatment. Ulane continued to fly until
finally taking a leave of absence to undergo reassignment surgery.
After surgery she was given permission to resume flying by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration. Eastern, however, refused to reem-
ploy Ulane as a pilot. Ulane brought suit under Title VII for
discrimination based on sex, claiming that the same employment
granted a man was being denied a woman. Alternatively, Ulane as-
serted that Title VII should apply to an individual who is discrimi-
nated against solely because of transsexual status.
7. See DSM III at 269; R. STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER 177 (1968).
8. These attractions are not considered by the transsexual to be homosexual, in that
the transsexual identifies him or herself with the opposite sex and so construes the rela-
tionship as heterosexual.
9. 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. 11. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2023, 85 L. Ed.2d 304 (1985).
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I was an expert witness in Karen Ulane's suit against Eastern. The
subjects I addressed in my testimony included the nature of
transsexualism and the various factors that influence sexual identity.
This testimony is detailed here to show that the courts had available
the most current behavioral science data describing both the phe-
nomenon of transsexualism and the complexity involved in defining
a person's sex.
[The phenomenon of transsexualism]
Q. Would you tell us what is a transsexual?
A. Transsexualism is a pervasive, severe, and long-standing discon-
tent, discomfort, belonging to the sex to which one was born. It is
accompanied by a long-standing wish for a variety of hormonal, surgi-
cal, and civil procedures which would allow one to live in the sex role
opposite to that to which one was born. This long-term discontent,
dysphoria, if you will, with being male or female, is not a product of
some significant type of mental disorder ...
Q Will you describe for me what you meant when you said that
transsexualism was not a product of a significant mental disorder?
A. Sometimes in schizophrenia, which is a significant mental disor-
der, one sees in a patient delusions of changing sex, delusions which
are somewhat transient, are a product of that psychotic state, of being
schizophrenic. Quite often they fade as the person recovers from a
schizophrenic episode. By contrast, this long standing, generally life-
long wish or discontent of being of the sex to which one was born (in
transsexualism) is not a product of some significant illness or delu-
sional thinking...
Q Now Doctor, I have also heard from time to time a word raised in
this context, and that is "transvestism" or "transvestites" . . . . Can
you tell us what, if anything, is different between these two terms?
A. A transvestite is an individual who is content being the sex to
which he was born, does not wish to undergo sex - so called sex-
change surgery. It is an individual whose primary gratification from
cross-dressing or dressing in women's clothes is one of sexual arousal
rather than a feeling of social comfort.' 0
[The nature of sexual identity]
Q. To what extent, Doctor, are these people now females after the
surgery as opposed to males as they were before the surgery?
A. That depends on one's definition of sex. If you are talking to a
legal definition of sex, in certain states, as I understand it, post-opera-
tive transsexuals do have legal sex change. . ..
Q Let's talk about just from a medical point of view, if we could.
A. If you are looking to the medical definitions of sex or gender,
there are a number of criteria that are used to describe gender or sex.





These include psychological sex. They include chromosomal sex.
They include hormonal sex. They include the anatomical structure of
the internal reproductive organs, and they include the appearance of
the external genitalia.
Q. As far as post-surgically speaking, are these people anatomically
male, or are they anatomically female?
A. It would depend on which criterion you use. If you look to chro-
mosomes, they would still be male. If you would look to the appear-
ance of the external genitalia, they would be female. If you look to the
psychological sex, they would be women. If you look to the hormonal
sex, if they were on replacement hormones, they would be women or
females.
Q. What is Karen Ulane's gender?
A. Karen Ulane is a woman.
Q. Would you explain that?
A. Karen Ulane psychologically has a sexual identity of female and
behaves socially and feels psychologically as a woman. She is legally,
as I understand it, a female and, additionally, psychologically a
woman. I
Psychiatric experts for Eastern asserted that Ulane was not a
transsexual, but rather was a transvestite. 12 They argued that since
surgery is not an appropriate treatment for transvestism, a poor psy-
chiatric outcome would follow. Thus, the pilot would be emotion-
ally unstable and airline passengers would be endangered. Arguing
in the alternative, Eastern's experts maintained that, even if Ulane
had been a transsexual, sex reassignment surgery is palliative at
best, with the long-term psychiatric results uncertain.' 3 Therefore,
they contended, Ulane, the transsexual, was too much of a psychiat-
ric risk to vest with the responsibility for piloting a commercial
aircraft.
The trial court wrestled both with the issues of Ulane's gender
status as a male or a female, and with Ulane's status as a transsexual.
Whether Ulane was now "legally" male or female was not clear to
the court, even though Illinois, the state in which Ulane had been
11. Id. at 252 (Sept. 27, 1983) (Dean Dickie, attorney for plaintiff).
12. This diagnosis was based on the fact that Ulane had been married as a male and
had functioned in a traditionally masculine social role, both in the military and as an
airline pilot. The contention was that the capacity to function in this manner precluded
the degree of feminine identification necessary for the diagnosis of transsexualism.
However, this contention ignored Karen Ulane's assertion that, while performing in
these roles, she had identified herself as a woman.
13. The long-term results of transsexual surgery are currently being collated from
several medical centers throughout the world. While there is no universal agreement,
some believe that, in carefully selected patients who have passed the presurgical "real
life test," favorable results far outnumber the unfavorable. Pauly, Outcome of Sex Reassign-
ment Surgery for Transsexuals 15 Ausr. N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 45 (1981).
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born, issued a new birth certificate designating Ulane female. The
court, while not finding the birth certificate change conclusive as to
Ulane's status as a female, did find the certificate "pertinent to the
question of plaintiff's sexual identity and the larger question of
whether sex is a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes."' 4 The
court's recognition of the complexity of sexual identity was relevant
to its finding on Title VII protection. Thus the term "sex" should
be "reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the
question of a person's sexual identity and . . . therefore, transsexu-
als are protected by Title VII."' 5
In its initial opinion, the court held that Ulane merited Title VII
relief because the statute should be interpreted to include transsex-
uals as a protected class.' 6 Discrimination based on Ulane's status
as a transsexual was proven to the satisfaction of the court. "[B]ut
for being a transsexual and but for having had the transsexual sur-
gery, the sex reassignment surgery, and adopting the life style of a
woman, the plaintiff would not have been discharged."1 7 In its sub-
sequent memorandum opinion and supplemental findings, the court
reconsidered the merits of plaintiff's argument regarding her status
as a woman and held that Title VII should "apply with equal force
whether plaintiff be regarded as a transsexual or as a female.' 8
While the trial court's ruling may have been designed as double
protection for Ulane, and as an "appeal proof' ruling, the court's
separation of the two classes in which Ulane was ruled protected
disserves the fundamental nature of transsexualism. The em-
ployee's status as a transsexual should not be separated from status
as a man or a woman. Transsexualism is as much a statement as to a
person's gender as is the designation of that person as a man or a
woman. For transsexuals (psychic hermaphrodites), as with ana-
tomic hermaphrodites, the usual (somatic) criteria of sex are an in-
complete description of gender. The psychologic criterion rules.
Since transsexualism is a statement about gender, the requirement
that the transsexual employee alternatively prove discrimination
based on status as a woman or a man and as a transsexual both cre-
ates and enforces an artificial distinction. This requirement under-
mines the psychiatric significance of the transsexual phenomenon.
The trial court ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
14. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 581 F. Supp. 821, 824 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
15. Id. at 825.
16. Id. at 837.
17. Id.




the Seventh Circuit.19 After taking notice of the lower court's rec-
ognition of Title VII as a "remedial statute" requiring broad inter-
pretation and conceding that "some may define 'sex' in such a way
as to mean an individual's 'sexual identity,'" the appellate court
stated, "our responsibility is to interpret this congressional legisla-
tion and determine what Congress intended when it decided to out-
law discrimination based on sex." 20
While the legitimacy of the legislative intent inquiry is well estab-
lished in Title VII jurisprudence, ascertaining the legislative intent
in this context is problematic. Title VII was initially designed to
remedy race discrimination. Sex as a basis for discrimination was
added as a floor amendment one day before the House approved
the bill. Purportedly, the sex amendment was added only as a
means of derailing the anti-race discrimination statute.2' However,
the tactic backfired and a statute banning both race and sex discrimi-
nation in employment passed. After conducting its own legislative
intent inqury, the appellate court in Ulane concluded that "[t]he
dearth of legislative history. . . strongly reinforces the view that the
section means nothing more than the plain language implies." 22
The plain language of Title VII, according to the court, did not im-
ply protection for transsexuals.
The legislative history of Title VII following its passage was also
used in Ulane to justify a narrow interpretation of the meaning of sex
or gender. In 1975, several (unsuccessful) bills were introduced in
Congress aimed at prohibiting discrimination based on "sexual
preference." 23 At least one other court has explicitly referred to the
failure of these bills to amend the Civil Rights Act to support its
holding that Title VII does not protect transsexuals. 24 However,
whether or not Title VII protects homosexuals should have nothing
to do with the issue of transsexual coverage under the Act. Sexual
orientation or sexual partner preference is not a reflection of one's
own gender. It addresses the gender of the person's partner.
Transsexualism, in contrast, addresses the gender of the individual
coming under the discriminatory classification. 25 Thus any legal
19. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
105 S.Ct. 2023, 85 L.Ed.2d 304 (1985).
20. Id. at 1084.
21. For a brief description of the legislative history, see id. at 1085.
22. Id. at 1085.
23. For a listing of unsuccessful congressional efforts in this regard, see id at 1085
n. 11.
24. Sommers v. Budget Marketing, 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
25. This distinction is underscored by the fact that the transsexual may be either
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doctrine equating sexual orientation with transsexualism is not built
on any secure behavioral science foundation.
Although the circuit court in Ulane acknowledged my lower court
testimony distinguishing transsexuals, homosexuals, and transves-
tites, 26 it found that the differences were not of further relevance:
"[w]hile we recognize [these] distinctions . . . we believe that the
same reasons for holding that the first two groups do not enjoy Title
VII coverage apply with equal force to deny protection for transsex-
uals." 2 7 Again, the reasoning of the court ignores the behavioral
science data. While transsexualism reflects the person's gender and
homosexuality the gender of a person's sexual partner, both are dis-
tinguishable from transvestism. The latter is a disorder of adornment
and attire.
IV. Other Cases
The courts' confusion over transsexualism is manifest from the
hodgepodge of other cases involving transsexual employee dismis-
sals. Focussing narrowly on the clothing worn by pre-operative
transsexuals, courts have upheld dismissals on the ground that the
employees in question violated dress-code regulations. 28 In the
case of one male-to-female transsexual who had dressed as a woman
as part of the sex-reassignment process, the court ruled that since
the employee was a male, no Title VII case could be made on the
basis of gender.2 9 In a similar dress-code action the court held that
the employee was "not being refused employment because he is a
man or because he [sic] is a woman. . . . [Therefore] Title VII and
the Constitution do not protect him. The law does not protect
males dressed or acting as females and vice versa." 3 0 (emphasis ad-
ded). The phrase "acting as a female" has been "clarified" further
by the Fifth Circuit to include "effeminacy" and is a sufficient basis
heterosexual or homosexual. Yet whether the reassigned male-to-female transsexual
seeks male or female partners, the person is still transsexual.
26. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3.
27. Id. at 1085.
28. Employee dress codes have been frequent sources of contention in litigation in-
volving both Title VII and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. Generally,
"reasonable" dress and appearance codes have been upheld, even when hair length
standards have been overruled. Doyle v. Buffalo Sidewalk Cafe Inc., 333 N.Y.S.2d 534,
70 Misc. 2d 212 (1972). Equal protection arguments are problematic for transsexuals
because they have not yet been declared a "suspect class" requiring the special protec-
tion of strict scrutiny. Nor have they been afforded the intermediate level of scrutiny
permitted women, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
29. Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981).





for denial of employment. 3'
"Misrepresentation" was the basis for another transsexual em-
ployee's dismissal. 32 The employee had specified sex as "female"
on the job application. The employee, however, was anatomically
male. After the employee was hired, "the company's work routine"
was disrupted when "a number of female employees indicated they
would quit if [the transsexual] were permitted to use the restroom
facilities assigned to female personnel." 33 The district court or-
dered the plaintiff to submit an amended complaint indicating
whether discrimination was based on status as a male, a female, or a
transsexual. In the amended complaint the plaintiff asserted that
discrimination was based on status as a female, "that is, a female
with the anatomical body of a male;" the transsexual's claim, how-
ever, was dismissed by the court as a "manipulation of semantics."34
Courts have denied other transsexuals' Title VII claims on the
ground that discrimination had not been based on the person's sex
per se, but rather on the individual's change of sex. One court, citing
"Congressional intent," noted that Title VII "speaks of discrimina-
tion on the basis of one's 'sex.' No mention is made of change of
sex . . .' .5 This court found it unnecessary to reach the "persua-
sive" evidence that the transsexual medical employee would have
had a "probable adverse impact. . .on the staff and patients in the
defendant's hemodialysis unit." 36 Protection of a person who has
"changed sex" was similarly denied in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen and
Co. where the court found that the plaintiff was not being discrimi-
nated against as a male or a female, but as a "transsexual who chose
31. Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. Sommers v. Budget Marketing Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
33. Id. at 748-49. Access to an appropriate restroom facility has been the subject of
other employment discrimination cases. When only one type of facility has been avail-
able, employers have contended that the sex of the employee becomes a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, permitting exemption from Title VII protection. However, the
EEOC has indicated that the cost of maintaining separate facilities and accommodations
for persons of one sex will not justify discrimination unless the cost is unreasonable.
EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 6137 (1970). Whether an employer would be required to
provide a separate facility for an employee whose presence in either the female or the
male employees' restroom was objected to has not been resolved.
34. Sommers v. Budget Marketing Inc., 667 F.2d at 749.
35. Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal.
1975), affd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 457 n.3. The fact that patients would object to the employee does not
appear to be a sufficient basis for health care employee dismissal unless there is a major
intrusion on patient privacy. For example, while a male nurse may be denied employ-
ment in an obstetrical delivery service, customer (or patient) preferences generally do
not prevail. Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (E.D. Ark.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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to change her sex." 37
The language of the Holloway court both reveals and illustrates a
prevalent tension in such rulings. The court appears to be saying
that transsexuals do not have a gender, yet utilizes language which
suggests that transsexuals do have a gender. After placing the
transsexual in a court-conceived non-gender class - neither male
nor female - it then necessarily relies on gender-typed language to
describe the person. That our language does not accommodate
"neuters" underscores the fact that society perceives human beings
as belonging to only one of two gender categories. People are
either male or female, no matter the type of surgery performed on
them. A male with cancer of the penis or testis is not rendered neu-
ter after organ removal. Nor is the transsexual rendered neuter af-
ter organ removal, with or without organ reconstruction.
The circuit court in Ulane stated that "the words of Title VII do
not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity
disorder." 38 If this is true, then the post-operative transsexual
plaintiff should be able to argue that he or she is being invidiously
discriminated against, not on the basis of having a disorder, but on
the basis of (the new) gender. Eastern could certainly not argue that
it would not have employed Karen Ulane in the former gender. In
this way, transsexuals are effectively caught in a legal "Catch 22." If
they allege discrimination on the basis of their status as male or fe-
male, the courts rule that they are not being discriminated against
on the basis of their sex, but because they are transsexual. On the
other hand, if they sue on the ground of discrimination because of
their status as transsexuals, the courts rule that transsexuals, as a
class, are not protected by Title VII.
The transsexual, qualified for employment in the original gender
and qualified for employment in the new gender, is disqualified as a
consequence of wanting to change from one protected gender class
to another protected gender class. Thus, according to the current
state of the law, it appears that transsexuals are inherently unqualified
to hold employment. This premise of inherent handicap was under-
scored in In re Grossman, the celebrated case of a transsexual school-
teacher who was dismissed following reassignment surgery. The
Grossman court noted that the individual had not been fired because
of the new status as a female but because of the consequences stem-
134
37. 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
38. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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ming from a change in sex from male to female.3 9
One possible basis for reaching a conclusion of inherent disquali-
fication is that change of sex is evidence of mental instability. This
argument was not advanced in Grossman as it was in Ulane. Alterna-
tively, an employer might argue that a person's decision to undergo
sex reassignment compromised employment performance. The lat-
ter was the issue in Grossman. The tenured music teacher was dis-
missed because the Board of Education maintained that she would
have an adverse effect on students, thus "incapacitating" her as a
teacher. The court suggested that the teacher might not be "inca-
pacitated" in another locale where her former sex status was not
known. 40
With pilot Ulane, Eastern Airlines was worried about distressing
passengers. The Airline was concerned that potential passengers
would refuse to fly in a plane piloted by Ulane because of their fears
that an "unstable" person in the cockpit would pose a threat to
safety.4 1 Eastern's case might have been stronger if their experts
had been able to provide credible testimony about Ulane's psychiat-
ric "incapacity" or disability post-sex-reassignment. This was not
possible, however, because Ulane had flown flawlessly for a decade
while experiencing substantial conflict over wanting to be a woman.
Now, with Ulane living as a woman, this conflict was necessarily
reduced.
The post-operative transsexual no longer has a mental disorder
according to the literal meaning of the DSM III diagnosis. 42 The
disorder exists pre-operatively when the person is grossly discon-
tent due to a sexual status dictated by anatomy. With sex reassign-
ment, that feature of the disorder is resolved. Even if courts were to
reject this pre- vs. post-operative distinction for the presence of
mental disorder, or if DSM III is revised to eliminate the distinction,
39. In re Grossman, 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974), afd sub. nom. Grossman
v. Bernards Township Board of Education, 538 F.2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 897 (1976).
40. However, other school districts might be curious as to which of them, with a new
female music teacher, had won the New Jersey sex-change-teacher lottery.
41. No evidence was offered by the airline demonstrating that a potential passen-
ger's concern for winning (or losing) the sex-change-pilot lottery would deter the per-
son rushing to the airport in an effort to catch the next shuttle to Washington.
Furthermore, while some passengers believe that a woman is not as competent to pilot a
plane as a man, no airline contends it has lost passengers upon hiring a female pilot. (A
common erroneous belief about the inadvisability of employing female pilots is the po-
tentially detrimental influence on piloting skills of premenstrual tension. It was quipped
during the course of the Ulane proceedings that Karen Ulane was the one woman pilot
for whom this was not a concern.)
42. DSM III at 269.
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it is the desperate quest for sex change that constitutes the psychiatric
problem of all transsexuals. Because not all persons continue to ex-
perience difficulty after surgery, the post-operative person should
be evaluated as an individual, not as a member of a class.
V. An Alternate Spelling of "Relief"?
While Title VII should spell relief for pre- and post-operative
transsexuals, it may be necessary to resort to the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. This Act prohibits discrimination
against any "otherwise qualified handicapped individual. ' 43 For
purposes of subchapters IV and V, a "handicapped" individual is
defined as "any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more such person's major life activ-
ities, (B) has a record of such impairment, or (C) is regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment." 44
The American Psychiatric Association description of transsexual-
ism provides support for the inclusion of transsexuals within this
Act. The DSM III diagnosis includes the phrases "persistent sense
of discomfort" . . . [and a] "disturbance [that] has been continuous
for at least two years . ... "45 Discussion of features associated
with transsexualism continues: "[g]enerally there is moderate to se-
vere coexisting personality disturbance. Frequently there is consid-
erable anxiety and depression which the individual may attribute to
inability to live in the role of the desired sex."'46 Under the section
describing "[i]mpairment and complications," the DSM III states
that
• . •social and occupational functioning are [frequently] markedly im-
paired partly because of associated psychopathology and partly be-
cause of problems encountered in attempting to live in the desired
gender role. Depression is common and can lead to suicide attempts.
In rare instances males may mutilate their genitals.47
A broad range of psychiatric conditions has been denominated
"handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act. Included are alcohol-
ism and personality disorders, 48 aggressive and self-destructive be-
havior,49 and suicidal behavior. 50 "Impairment" as defined in
43. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1982).
45. DSM III at 261-62.
46. Id. at 262.
47. Id. at 263.
48. See, e.g., Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983).




regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services in-
cludes "any mental or psychological disorder, such as. . .emotional
or mental illness." 5' Handicaps cognizable under the Act are not
confined to "persons who have those severe, permanent or
progressable conditions that are most commonly regarded as handi-
caps." 52 Indeed, courts have been most flexible in defining
"handicap":
The definitions contained in the [Rehabilitation] Act are personal and
must be evaluated by looking at the particular individual. A handi-
capped individual is one who has a physical or mental disability which
for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to
employment. It is the impaired individual that must be examined and
not just the impairment in the abstract. 53
A recent case involving a transsexual's suit against the United
States Postal Service offers promise that the Rehabilitation Act
might spell relief in some circumstances. 54 There, an employment
offer was rescinded after it was learned that the prospective em-
ployee was a pre-operative transsexual. The court ruled that the
transsexual's complaint adequately alleged the necessary "physical
or mental impairment" to state a claim under the Act. The court
noted that while the burden rested with the job applicant to prove
that transsexualism is "an impairment which substantially limits one
or more major life activities," 55 the definition of handicap extends
to those who are merely "regarded" as handicapped by others. 56
A ruling that transsexuals are protected under the Rehabilitation
Act could pose a hardship for some. While the Act might have pro-
vided relief in Sommers and Voyles, if pilot Ulane had been terminated
by Eastern while still pre-operative (and, by definition, suffering
conflict over wanting to change sex), an argument for protection by
virtue of having a severe emotional handicap would hardly soothe
the airline's concerns about passenger safety. Furthermore, if the
condition of transsexualism per se were judged a significant handi-
cap, then the handicap could continue post-operatively, in spite of
the literal meaning of the diagnosis. This, too, would hardly benefit
pilot Ulane, if schoolteacher Grossman's experience is any indica-
50. Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission, 704 F.2d
1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1985).
52. 45 C.F.R. § 84, App. A (1985).
53. E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Hawaii 1980).
54. Jane Doe v. United States Postal Service, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1867
(D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
55. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1985).
56. Id.
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tion of how the judiciary is apt to interpret "handicap" in this con-
text. Indeed, Grossman was fired because she was "incapacitated"
by the transsexual surgery. In addition, if the handicap is in "the
eyes of the beholder," the nature of the person's employment might
still be such that the employee's presence could be considered too
disruptive to the work place to allow the worker to continue on the
job as was posited in Grossman.
VI. Ulane as a "Transracial"
If there were a manner by which a person could "change race"
rather than "sex," could a "transracial" be denied protection under
Title VII? 5 7 Race, for some persons, may be no more immutable
than is sex for others. Consider a person of mixed black and white
racial heritage, tan skinned, with moderately curled hair and no fa-
cial features clearly identifiable as black. Assume this person has
always "as far back as s(he) can remember" been self-identified as
black, but, nevertheless, has been treated by society as white. In the
past, this person has utilized grooming chemicals that straighten
hair. Assume also that the person is legally classified as white, hav-
ing the requisite number of white ancestors. Now the person stops
utilizing hair straightening chemicals, and undergoes plastic surgery
to broaden the contours of the nose. Then, in keeping with a racial
identity as black, this person presents himself or herself to the world
as black.
Should an employer consider this person as white or black? If the
person were to be not hired or fired on the basis of membership in a
racial class that has been the target of discrimination, would this be
legally permissible? If the person were to be not hired or fired on
the basis of having changed race, would this be legally permissible?
If membership in a race or gender class is protected by law from
invidious discrimination, we need to discern the basis on which
changing to that race or gender class might eliminate protection.
Perhaps the basis is that "voluntary" membership in the class is not
protected because protected class membership is generally the con-
sequence of an "immutable characteristic." 58 The transsexual
should prevail on this ground of argument, however, because be-
havioral science data demonstrate that there is nothing "voluntary"
57. This metaphor is employed as a model in which the individual's self-perception
differs from social appearance. It is not used to argue the extent to which race is a
biological or political construct.




about sexual or gender identity. Only sexual anatomy is mutable.
There is no psychiatric "cure" for eliminating the conviction of be-
ing of the opposite sex:
Over the years, psychiatrists have tried repeatedly to treat these peo-
ple without surgery, and the conclusion is inescapable that psychother-
apy has not so far solved the problem... .the high incidence of suicide
and self-mutilation among these people testifies to the magnitude of
the problem. If the mind cannot be changed to fit the body, then per-
haps we should consider changing the body to fit the mind. 59
Deeming transsexual surgery "voluntary" denies the necessity of
transsexual surgery. Suicide is often the tragic consequence when
this procedure is denied. 60
VII. Conclusion
The foregoing is more than a critique of the unduly narrow appli-
cation of an employment law barring discrimination based on sex.
It addresses the significance of behavioral science in the interpreta-
tion of the law.
The understanding of human sexual behavior has grown remarka-
bly during recent decades. Science has demonstrated that the "sim-
ple" categorization of a person as a man or as a woman is, in fact, a
highly complex task. Indeed, there is no consensus on what consti-
tutes a male or a female. The most sensitive criterion, however, is
that which is consistent with the person's identity. When courts do
not appreciate the general psychological as well as somatic manifes-
tations of gender and the practical application of these data to
transsexualism, an already conflicted population is subjected to ad-
ditional suffering. The transsexual's dilemma is especially ironic.
Medical science requires that the pre-operative transsexual demon-
strate suitability for life-saving surgery by successful employment in
the new gender role. Yet this demonstration is frustrated by a rig-
idly narrow application of the law which protects against discrimina-
tion based on gender.
Under the common law it was not a crime to change name, even
to one of the "opposite" sex, so long as the choice was not made to
perpetrate fraud. 61 The subjective importance of a person's identity
has long been recognized at law. It would therefore be legally just,
psychologically humane, and scientifically valid to afford transsexu-
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als protection under Title VII. Forcing transsexuals to seek relief
under the Rehabilitation Act may provide only a partial respite. Full
relief should be spelled "Title VII."
-Richard Green
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